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OPINION 
 
 
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
Permaeshwar Singh appeals the district court’s judgment of sentence that was 
imposed following his guilty plea.  Though Singh’s crime of conviction, the “controlled 
substance” provision of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06, features the same elements as the 
generic federal offense, and the New York statute outlaws one substance that federal law 
does not, chorionic gonadotropin, the district court did not have the opportunity to 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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determine whether there is a realistic probability that New York would prosecute anyone 
under § 220.06(1) for possession of chorionic gonadotropin.  We will therefore remand 
for the district court to make this determination.    
I. 
The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We 
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Because Singh admits that he did not 
challenge the classification of the “controlled substance” provision of N.Y. Penal Law § 
220.06 as a predicate offense for purposes of the career criminal sentence enhancement 
before the district court, we review for plain error. Under plain-error review, we must 
reverse if (1) there was an “error;” (2) the error was “plain;” (3) it “affect[ed] substantial 
rights;” and (4) not correcting the error would “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or 
public reputation of judicial proceedings.”1 The defendant, and not the Government, 
bears the burden of persuasion under plain error review.2 
II. 
At issue here is the district court’s determination that Singh qualifies as a career 
offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Under the guidelines, “a defendant is a career offender 
if . . . the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence 
or a controlled substance offense.”3 The district court ruled that Singh’s conviction for 
violating N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06 qualified as a “controlled substance offense” under 
                                              
1 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quoting United States v. Young, 47 
U.S. 1, 15 (1985)); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).   
2 Olano, 507 U.S.at 734. 
3 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a). 
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U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2(b). At sentencing, Singh did not challenge this 
characterization of § 220.06. Instead, he argued that his convictions for attempted assault 
and possession of a controlled substance in violation of § 220.06 should be counted as a 
single conviction for purposes of § 4B1.1. The district court correctly rejected this 
argument. “Prior sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were imposed 
for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for 
the first offense prior to committing the second offense).”4  
Abandoning that argument, Singh now contends that the subsection of 220.06 that 
he was convicted under does not qualify as a “controlled substance offense” for the 
purposes of the federal sentencing guidelines.  He argues N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06 is a 
divisible statute that must be analyzed using the modified categorical approach, that he 
was convicted under subsection (1) of  N.Y. Penal Law §220.06, and that because this 
subsection criminalizes more conduct than its federal counterpart, it cannot be used as a 
predicate under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  
 
III. 
Generally, courts apply the categorical approach to determine whether a prior state 
conviction is a “controlled substance offense” for sentencing guidelines purposes.5 In 
applying the categorical approach, a court is required to ignore the “facts,” which are 
                                              
4 Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2). 
5 See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). 
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“mere real-world things–extraneous to the crime’s legal requirements,” and focus instead 
“solely on whether the elements of the crime of conviction sufficiently match.”6 Elements 
are the “constituent parts” of a crime’s legal definition–the things the “prosecution must 
prove to sustain a conviction.”7 But facts are “circumstances,” events that have no legal 
effect or consequence on the conviction.8 When the “elements” of a state and federal law 
match, the state law can serve as a predicate offense for purposes of the sentencing 
guidelines.9 Otherwise, the state statute sweeps more broadly and “no conviction under 
that law could count” as a § 4B1.1 predicate.10 
 “The comparison of elements that the categorical approach requires is 
straightforward when a statute sets out a single (or ‘indivisible’) set of elements to define 
a single crime.”11 But “[a] single statute may list elements in the alternative, and thereby 
define multiple crimes.”12 Such a scenario requires the application of the modified 
categorical approach, which requires a sentencing court to determine “which of the 
alternative elements listed . . . was integral to the defendant’s conviction.”13 The modified 
categorical approach allows a court to examine a limited number of documents to 
determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of.14 But the 
                                              
6 Id. 
7 Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).  
8 Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted).  
9 United States v. Brown, 765 F. 3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2014). 
10 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id.  
14 See, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). 
 
 
 
6
modified categorical approach still “retains the categorical approach’s central feature: a 
focus on the elements, rather than the facts, of a crime.”15 Therefore, as with the 
categorical approach, a “defendant’s crime of conviction can count as a predicate only if 
its elements match those of a generic offense.”16  
N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06 is divisible.17 The statute is broken into eight different 
subsections, creating eight different offenses.18 For purposes of federal sentencing, some 
of these offenses as written are more serious than others. For example, in Henriquez a 
defendant was charged under § 220.06. The court consulted Shepard documents to 
determine that the defendant pleaded guilty for a violation of subsection (5) of the statute, 
which criminalizes the possession of cocaine that weighs 500 milligrams or more.19 
There, the court correctly concluded that an analysis of subsection (5) under the modified 
categorical approach established that Henriquez had been convicted for the possession of 
cocaine, a controlled substance under federal law. But an analysis of subsection (1), leads 
us to a different conclusion.  
Shepard documents reveal that Singh was convicted under the first provision of 
the statute, which states that a person is guilty of a class D felony of criminal possession 
of a controlled substance in the fifth degree when he or she knowingly and unlawfully 
                                              
15 Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 263 (2013).  
16 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251. 
17 See Henriquez v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 2018). 
18 See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249 (California burglary law “prohibited ‘the lawful entry or 
the unlawful entry’ of a premises with intent to steal, so as to create two different 
offenses, one more serious than the other”). 
19 Henriquez, 890 F.3d at 72. 
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posesses “a controlled substance with intent to sell it.”20 New York law at the time of 
Singh’s conviction had a broader definition of a controlled substance than its federal 
counterpart. New York law defined a “controlled substance” as “any substance listed in 
schedule I, II, II, IV, or V of section thirty-three hundred six of the public health law 
other than marihuana.”21 New York’s Schedule II included chorionic gonadotropin as a 
prohibited drug.22 The New York prohibition against chorionic gonadotropin extends 
beyond the substances prohibited by the Federal Controlled Substances Act.23 The 
“controlled substance” provision of § 220.06 is therefore more broad than its federal 
counterpart because it criminalizes the possession of more substances than the federal 
law. Further, a prosecutor is not required to prove which drug a person alleged to have 
violated the first provision of § 220.06 possessed, as the substance is a means of 
commission, rather than an element of the crime.24  
However, to conclusively demonstrate that first provision of § 220.06 cannot serve 
as a predicate offense under § 4B1.1, Singh must also show a realistic probability that 
New York would prosecute someone under § 220.06(1) for possession with intent to sell 
chorionic gonadotropin.  In Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, the Supreme Court held that it 
takes “more than the application of legal imagination” to find that a state law criminalizes 
                                              
20 N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06 (McKinney 2004). 
21 Id. § 220.00(5) (McKinney 2004). 
22 See N.Y. Public Health Law § 3306, Schedule II(j) (listing any material, compound, 
mixture, or preparation which contains any amount of chorionic gonadotropin). 
23 21 U.S.C. § 812. 
24 See People v. Gagnier, 146 A.D.3d 1019, 1021 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).   
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conduct outside the generic federal definition of the crime.25  Instead, such a finding 
“requires a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its 
statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.”26  “A defendant 
may establish such a probability by showing that the state statute was so applied in his or 
her own case or by pointing to other cases in which the state courts applied the statute in 
a non-generic fashion.”27 
The parties did not raise this issue with the district court and thus did not present it 
with evidence upon which it could make this determination.  We will therefore remand 
for the district court to determine whether there is a realistic probability that New York 
would prosecute someone for possessing with intent to sell chorionic gonadotropin in 
violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06(1).  If the Court finds a realistic probability of such 
prosecution, then the first provision of § 220.06 cannot serve as a predicate offense under 
§ 4B1.1, and the Court should resentence Singh.  If there is no such realistic probability, 
the Court can maintain the sentence it previously imposed. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will remand for proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.    
                                              
25 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007).  
26 Id. 
27 United States v. Daniels, 915 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2019). 
